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When a choice set consists of a distribution of alternatives with correlated benefits and costs, consumers often exhibit single-peaked preferences -they prefer an alternative having moderate costs and benefits. Theories disagree about how adding additional lower benefit / lower cost or higher benefit / higher cost alternatives to this choice set will affect relative preferences for the initial set of alternatives. Prototype theory predicts that adding alternatives should produce assimilation, whereas multiattribute range-frequency theory predicts that it creates contrast. We reconcile these two theories by assuming that single-peaked preferences reflect a composition of underlying benefit and cost valuations. Moreover, we claim that the correlational structure of the benefit and cost dimensions in the contextual stimuli determines whether these stimuli will exert an assimilation or contrast effect. We show that when benefits and costs are correlated (uncorrelated), adding alternatives that extend the range of offerings produces assimilation (contrast) for preference judgments. We propose a cost-benefit tradeoff model that incorporates elements of single-peaked preference theory (Coombs and Avrunin 1977) and range-frequency theory (Parducci 1965) to explain the complex fashion in which contextual stimuli affect consumer ideals.
The majority of consumer research on context effects has focused on the impact of contextual manipulations on the monotonic relationship between stimulus levels and preference (e.g., Herr 1989; Lynch, Chakravarti, and Mitra 1991; Meyers-Levy and Tybout 1997; Niedrich, Sharma, and Wedell 2001) . Monotonic relationships are those in which increases in the stimulus intensity produce uniformly increasing (or decreasing) judgments. Numerous studies have shown that when contextual stimuli are inserted at one end of a distribution of stimuli, evaluations of the stimuli near the middle of the distribution shift away from the contextual stimuli, a phenomenon referred to as a contrast effect. For example, adding a number of low-priced alternatives to a consumer's awareness set makes a moderately priced alternative seem more expensive, whereas adding a number of high-priced alternatives to a consumer's awareness set makes a moderately priced alternative seem less expensive (Janiszewski and Lichtenstein 1999; Niedrich et al. 2001 ).
Much less is known about the influence of contextual manipulations on consumer responses to non-monotonic relationships between stimulus levels and preference. Most relevant to consumer research are single-peaked relationships in which perceived value first rises then falls as stimulus intensity is increased. Single-peaked preferences are exemplified in alternatives varying in the amount (e.g., meat, produce), duration (e.g., a vacation package, a subscription), or number (e.g., housing, electronics, automobiles) of benefits. Single-peaked preferences are hypothesized to emerge because alternatives are composed of underlying benefit and cost dimensions (Coombs and Avrunin 1977) . People are presumed to satiate faster to benefits than to costs and, as a consequence, exhibit single-peaked preferences (Coombs and Avrunin 1977) .
The dearth of research investigating the effect of context on single-peaked preferences may be a consequence of the assumptions that have accompanied explanations of single-peaked preferences. In Coombs and Avrunin's (1977) original explanation of single-peaked preferences, it was assumed that the utility associated with a certain level of a benefit or cost dimension was fixed by an individual's psychophysical functions. Although this theory permitted individual differences in ideals, it also implied that the ideals for any given consumer were fixed and invariant to context. Given this assumption, it is not surprising that investigations using stimuli (i.e., single-peaked attributes) that have the potential to exhibit a single-peaked relationship have used procedures that prohibit the emergence of a contextual influence. Some studies have limited contextual manipulations to one monotonic attribute (e.g., price) by fixing a second monotonic attribute (e.g., product benefit) at a constant level (e.g., Urbany, Bearden, and Weilbaker 1988) .
Other studies have allowed context to influence multiple product attributes but limited the investigation to a single product (e.g., Meyers-Levy and Sternthal 1993), a procedure that makes it impossible to observe changes in preference among competing alternatives. In other cases, preferences have been measured for multiple multi-attribute products but contextual alternatives have been designed to affect the stimulus distribution of a single monotonic attribute (e.g., Lynch et al. 1991) .
Recently, Wedell and Pettibone (1999) investigated the effects of context on singlepeaked preferences and on the attributes that are presumed to influence these preferences. Wedell and Pettibone (1999) investigated attractiveness ratings for line-drawn faces having variable nose widths and variable distances between the eyes. They found that adding contextual faces having narrower (wider) nose widths than the existing set of faces resulted in assimilation on attractiveness judgments but contrast on perceptual judgments. The face judged as most beautiful had a narrower (wider) nose when the narrow-nosed (wide-nosed) contextual faces were present than when they were absent. Respondents also judged the noses on the target faces as wider (narrower) when the narrow-nosed (wide-nosed) contextual faces were present.
Although the Wedell and Pettibone (1999) results are intriguing, they are also conceptually troubling. Their results suggest that introducing contextual alternatives into a 6 choice set will produce contrast when a consumer relies on a single, monotonic attribute (e.g., price or quantity) to make a decision, but assimilation when a consumer relies on preferences based on an integration of attributes (e.g., price and quantity) to make a decision. Wedell and Pettibone (1999) address this conceptual inconsistency by arguing that context influences judgments via two independent processes. They claim that for monotonic attributes, context influences perceptual judgment through range-frequency principles, whereas for single-peaked attributes, judgments are based on a comparison to a prototype that is approximated by the mean of the distribution. Moreover, Wedell and Pettibone (1999) recognize that many single-peaked attributes can be treated as composites of monotonic attributes (i.e., explicit attributes) or monotonic dimensions (i.e., implicit attributes) and that it is impossible to produce an assimilation effect by combining multiple contrast effects. They address this problem by arguing that there is a class of naturally single-peaked attributes (e.g., taste, volume, temperature) that operate according to different processes and principles.
We believe that the Wedell and Pettibone results will generalize to many types of singlepeaked preferences and confirm this prediction in experiment 1. As such, the claim that there is a special class of naturally single-peaked attributes cannot solve the problem of concurrent assimilation and contrast effects on different judgments of the same alternatives. Moreover, we argue that there is a more parsimonious explanation of the influence of context on judgments of single-peaked and monotonic attributes. We propose a cost-benefit tradeoff model that incorporates elements of single-peaked preference theory and range-frequency theory. We provide evidence that it is the confounded nature of the underlying cost and benefit dimensions in single-peaked attributes that leads to assimilation (experiment 2). We also directly manipulate the consumer's sensitivity to benefits and costs and show that the manipulation produces the predicted shift in consumer ideals (experiment 3).
CONTEXT EFFECTS
The influence of context on preference and choice is pervasive. Contextual stimuli are responsible for attraction effects , asymmetric dominance effects (Huber, Payne, and Puto 1983) , tradeoff contrast effects (Simonson and Tversky 1992) , and compromise effects (Simonson 1989) . Contextual factors that influence judgments include the extremeness of the contextual stimuli (Herr 1989) , the degree of similarity between the contextual and target stimuli (Meyers-Levy and Sternthal 1993) , and the similarity of stimulus levels in comparative judgments (Tversky 1977) . Judgments also depend on the timing of the contextual manipulation (Wedell 1994) , the order of the stimulus presentation (Kahn, Moore, and Glazer 1987) , the direction of comparison (Tversky 1977) , and the framing of the alternatives (Janiszewski, Silk, and Cooke 2003) . However, despite its pervasiveness, context research has disproportionately focused on single or multiple monotonic attributes while ignoring correlated costs and benefits that result in single-peaked preferences.
Single-peaked Preferences
Single-peaked preferences are of particular interest for consumer research. For example, consumers are known to prefer moderately sweet drinks (Best 1976) , moderately fast music (Holbrook and Anand 1990) , and a balance between architectural dimensions (Baird, Cassidy, and Kurr 1978) . Historically, single-peaked preferences have been described by unfolding models (Coombs 1964; Cooper and Inoue 1996) . Standard unfolding models assume that the ideal point is fixed for each individual and that the consumer's valuation of the stimulus decreases with the distance from this ideal point. Thus, standard unfolding models have no mechanism for incorporating an influence of changes in context -adding stimuli to the distribution should have no influence on the location of the ideal point.
Recently, Wedell and Pettibone (1999) have identified a single-peaked attribute that is sensitive to contextual stimuli. Wedell and Pettibone show that judgments of the most beautiful or ideal face assimilate toward faces added to either end of a distribution of facial features (e.g., nose widths). Wedell and Pettibone (1999) argue that this context effect implies that people use a prototype model to make preference judgments. Prototype models of categorization typically assume that stimuli are compared to a single category prototype that is located so as to minimize the aggregate disparity between the category exemplars and the prototype. Because the prototype is assumed to depend on the central tendency of the distribution, prototype theories can explain how changes in stimulus context will affect ideal points. To illustrate, consider the following multiattribute prototype model (Nosofsky 1986; Wedell and Pettibone 1999) .
The squared psychological distance, d 2 i,ideal , between stimulus i and the category prototype ideal is given by the sum of the squared differences between stimulus i and the prototype ideal across all attributes m, where w m is the weight for attribute m, c is a constant of discriminability, S im is the scale value of stimulus i on attribute m, and ideal m is the value of the ideal point on attribute m. For a single attribute, this model reduces to
Thus, if a stimulus set had the values 5, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 21, the ideal point (i.e., central tendency) should be 13 and the stimulus having value 13 should receive the highest rating, the stimuli having value 11 and 15 should receive the next highest ratings, and so forth. If we add contextual stimuli having values 1 and 3 to this set, the mean changes to 10.5 and the stimulus having the value 11 should receive the highest rating. Likewise, if we add stimuli having values 23 and 25 to the focal set, the mean will shift to 15.5 and the stimulus having the value 15 should receive the highest rating.
(1)
Monotonic Attributes
Although a prototype model can explain assimilation effects on single-peaked attributes, it cannot explain contrast effects on the attributes or dimensions that are integrated to generate the single-peaked response. When contextual alternatives are from the same class of stimuli as focal alternatives, range-frequency theory (Parducci 1965 (Parducci , 1995 provides an adequate description of consumer judgments (see Meyers-Levy and Tybout [1997] for a discussion of other-category contextual stimuli). According to range-frequency theory, the judgment, J i , of stimulus i is sensitive to the weighted combination of the range over which the stimuli vary and the ordinal position of the stimulus in the distribution.
Range-frequency theory predicts that the range component of the judgment, R i , will reflect the metric position of the stimulus within the stimulus range:
Likewise, the frequency component, F i , will reflect the ordinal position of the stimulus within the distribution of N stimuli:
Range-frequency theory predicts that the addition of contextual stimuli will result in contrast for a monotonic attribute. To illustrate, consider the values 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, and 21 mapped on to a 101-point scale (i.e., A min = 0, A max = 100). If contextual stimuli having values 1 and 3 are added to this distribution to extend its range downward, ratings of all but the highest stimulus contrast upward from the added stimuli. Contrast effects owing to stimulus range and density have been demonstrated in judgments of physical attractiveness, happiness, liking, and price attractiveness as well as in psychophysical judgments of square size, line width, and numerosity (cf. Cooke and Mellers 1998; Niedrich et al. 2001 ).
(5)
(4)
COST-BENEFIT TRADEOFF MODEL
The preceding discussion suggests a conundrum. On the one hand, studies of singlepeaked attributes indicate that contextual stimuli affect preferences by producing assimilation.
On the other hand, studies of monotonic attributes indicate that contextual stimuli affect perceptions by producing contrast. Moreover, Wedell and Pettibone (1999) show that both effects can occur concurrently for different judgments of the same alternatives. How can it be that contextual changes result in contrast for perceptual judgments that are monotonically related to the attributes, but result in assimilation for preference judgments that are non-monotonically related to the attributes? Wedell and Pettibone argue that context influences different judgments in different ways. They claim that for monotonic attributes, the stimulus distribution influences judgment through range-frequency principles, whereas for single-peaked attributes, judgments are based on comparison to a prototype that is approximated by the mean of the distribution.
Although this account allows Wedell and Pettibone to explain their results, it lacks parsimony.
A more parsimonious explanation may be seen in the early work on single-peaked preferences. Coombs and Avrunin (1977) propose a theory of single-peaked preferences in which the single-peaked response represents a composite of more elementary dimensions. One dimension reflects the benefits, whereas the other dimension reflects the costs that accrue from consumption of the product. For example, when deciding how much time to take for vacation, benefits accrue with time -the more time one has, the more places one can visit. However, costs also accrue with time -the negative effects of being away from one's home, friends, and placeof-work, as well as the direct costs of the vacation, typically increase with time. Coombs and Avrunin (1977) argue that single-peaked preferences are composites of benefit and cost dimensions, and that people satiate on the benefit dimension faster than they sensitize to the cost dimension; thus, preferences for the composite attribute are single-peaked. Coombs and Avrunin (1977) use examples of single-peaked attributes (e.g., flavor preferences), where the underlying benefit and cost dimensions are difficult to specify, and single-peaked preferences (e.g., length of vacation), where the underlying benefit and cost dimensions are easier to specify. Thus, unlike Wedell and Pettibone (1999) , Coombs and Avrunin (1977) assume that these two types of singlepeaked relationships rely on a common process. Coombs and Avrunin's (1977) model of single-peaked preferences can be combined with range-frequency theory to account for a contrast effect on an individual attribute (e.g., perception
of size or quantity) and an assimilation effect on a composite attribute (e.g., preference for a particular size or quantity). The perceptual judgment, P i , of stimulus i is given by Consistent with Coombs and Avrunin (1977) , the cost power parameter is greater than the benefit power parameter resulting in single-peaked preferences. For most parameter values, incremental gains in benefits will initially be greater than incremental increases in costs and the benefit to cost difference will increase. At some point, incremental benefits will increase at a
lower rate than incremental costs and there will be declining preference for additional units of the attribute. However, in situations in which the weight of the benefits (s) or costs (1-s) is particularly large relative to the other, the model can predict monotonic preferences (either increasing or decreasing).
The cost-benefit model can account for assimilation effects in single-peaked preferences.
First, consider a baseline model with the stimuli 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19 , and 21, α = 1, β = 2, and s = .5. The baseline condition graph in figure 1A shows the benefit (diamonds), cost (squares), and the value for the difference between the benefits and costs (triangles) for each stimulus. The differences represent the single-peaked preference function. It peaks at the midpoint of the distribution (stimulus 13) and is symmetric around this mid-point. When low benefit, low cost contextual stimuli (e.g., 2, 3, 4) are added to the distribution of stimuli, the peak shifts to a lower value (figure 1B). This occurs because the contextual stimuli have extended the range of the distribution, and by extension the mid-point, downward. When high benefit, high cost contextual stimuli (e.g., 22, 23, 24) are added to the distribution of stimuli, the ideal point shifts to a higher value for analogous reasons ( figure 1C ). Of course, the actual inflection point for a
given set of stimuli is a function of the power parameters on the benefit and cost functions and the relative weight used to integrate costs and benefits.
EXPERIMENT 1
The goal of experiment 1 was to examine the effects of context on consumer stimuli that typically produce single-peaked preferences, but are not of the class of stimuli that are normally described as "single-peaked attributes" (e.g., sensory judgments, beauty judgments). We chose to manipulate a common consumer benefit (product quantity) that is typically associated with a cost (total product price). Based on the results of Wedell and Pettibone (1999) , we predicted that adding contextual stimuli should result in assimilation for preference judgments and contrast for perceptual judgments of product size (i.e., a benefit judgment).
Procedure and Stimuli
The experiment used a between-subjects factorial design (low, high context) with two dependent measures (preference judgment and perceptual judgment). Participants were asked to perform a series of preference judgments followed by a series of perceptual judgments. In the preference judgment task, participants were asked to imagine that they were hosting a dinner party for two people and had to purchase an appetizer. Upon visiting the store, they saw different size pieces of brie cheese. They had to determine if the piece of cheese was the appropriate size to purchase. In the perceptual judgment task, participants were asked to judge the size of each piece of cheese.
After participants read the instructions, stimuli were presented using a computer program.
Each stimulus set consisted of color pictures of seven focal and six contextual stimuli. The focal stimuli were wedges of brie cheese that had sizes, as measured by the chord connecting the two endpoints of the arc, of 5, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, and 21 centimeters. The low benefit contextual stimuli had sizes of 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, and 8 centimeters and the high benefit contextual stimuli had sizes of 18, 19, 20, 22, 23 , and 24 centimeters. Each piece of cheese was displayed on a cheese board with a cheese knife, crackers, and grapes serving as a measurement standard.
First, participants saw each of the 13 pieces of cheese for four seconds so they could become familiar with the range of sizes they would judge. Then, participants made preference judgments of the 13 stimuli four times, using a different random order for each of four blocks.
Preference judgments were made using a 100-point scale anchored "inappropriate size to purchase" and "appropriate size to purchase". The procedure was then repeated for the perceptual judgments. Perceptual judgments were made using a 100-point scale anchored "narrow" and "wide". The four rounds of judgments did not interact with any of the experimental manipulations, so judgments of individual stimuli were averaged into summary measures of preference (α = .93) and perception (α = .94). For a given participant, the same set of stimuli (e.g., low or high benefit context) was used for both preference and perceptual judgments. Fortytwo undergraduates recruited from an introductory marketing course were randomly assigned to one of the two context conditions.
Results
Perceptual Judgments. Figure 2A Preference Judgments. Figure 2B presents the mean preference judgments for each context. Our analysis of these data proceeded in three steps. First, we confirmed that the interaction between context and stimulus level was statistically significant (F(6, 240) = 11.8, p < .01). This result implies that there are different peaks in the two context conditions. Second, we confirmed that there were significant differences in the rank-order of the focal stimuli. Using
Friedman's rank test for correlated samples, we found that preferences among the seven stimuli varied significantly both in the low benefit context (χ 2 F (6) = 65.6, p < .01) and in the high benefit context (χ 2 F (6) = 49.3, p < .01) conditions. 1 Furthermore, an examination of individual participant preferences showed that 93.0% of the participants had single-peaked preferences.
Third, we tested for an assimilation effect of the contextual stimuli. In the low benefit context, the stimulus with the highest mean rating was the 9 cm stimulus, whereas in the high benefit context, the stimulus having the highest mean rating was the 13 cm stimulus. Comparing preferences for the 9 cm and 13 cm stimuli across contexts, we found that 85.8% of the participants in the low benefit context preferred the 9 cm stimulus to the 13 cm stimulus, whereas only 28.6% of the participants in the high benefit context preferred the 9 cm stimulus to the 13 cm stimulus (z = 3.74, p < .01).
Cost-Benefit Tradeoff Model Fit.
To further explore the effects of context on perceptual judgments and preference judgments, we fitted the cost-benefit tradeoff model to the data using regression. First, we used equation 6 to fit perceptual judgments of the size. The cost-benefit tradeoff model accounted for 98.3% of the variance attributable to the experimental manipulations (71.4% of 72.6%). Second, we used equation 7 to fit preference judgments. We assumed that the benefit (α) and cost (β) power parameters, and the relative weight of the benefit (s) and cost (1-s) dimension, were equal across the two contexts. In other words, we tried to account for the effect of context on shifts in the most preferred stimulus using only the changes in stimulus scale values as predicted by range-frequency theory. Although the predictions of the model did not vary as much as the data (the peak of the low benefit context curve is not as great as the peak in the data), the model was able to capture the stimulus orders nearly perfectly (see figure 2B ). The cost-benefit tradeoff model accounted for 90.2% of the variance attributable to the experimental manipulations (35.1% of 38.9%).
Discussion
Our data replicate the results reported by Wedell and Pettibone (1999) . We found that perceptual judgments were monotonic and tended to contrast away from contextual stimuli.
However, judgments of preference were single-peaked and assimilated toward contextual stimuli. This replication shows that assimilation effects on single-peaked attributes are not limited to a particular set of attributes like beauty, taste, and music tempo, but generalize to the single-peaked attributes that characterize many consumer judgments (e.g., purchase quantity).
The goal of experiment 2 was to differentiate between the cost-benefit tradeoff model and
Wedell and Pettibone's (1999) claim of two independent processes (henceforth referred to as the independent process model). The crux of the cost-benefit tradeoff explanation of contextual assimilation is that single-peaked preferences reflect the confounding of benefit and cost dimensions among the stimuli, and that people satiate less quickly to costs than to benefits. If this is true, unconfounding the benefit and cost dimensions should produce a large contextual effect for one dimension and a relatively small effect for the other dimension, as has been observed for independently manipulated attributes (e.g., Cooke and Mellers 1998; Mellers and Cooke 1994) .
For example, inserting low benefit stimuli that have uncorrelated costs should encourage people to perceive existing moderate benefit stimuli as having greater benefits while not altering perceptions of the costs. Thus, the cost-benefit tradeoff model predicts that inserting low benefit stimuli will result in contrast for single-peaked preferences in a situation in which the benefits and costs of the inserted stimuli are uncorrelated. Alternatively, if preference judgments are single-peaked due to an underlying process of prototype comparison, reducing the correlation between the benefit and cost dimensions of contextual stimuli should not affect how context influences ideals.
EXPERIMENT 2
In this experiment, we manipulate the correlation between benefits and costs among the contextual stimuli. To do this, we made two modifications to our contextual stimuli. First, we explicitly mentioned the price (cost) of each piece of cheese. Second, the six contextual cheeses were replaced by something other than brie cheese (e.g., Glouster, Leyden, Gouda, etc.). This change allowed us to manipulate the correlation between price and quantity in the set of contextual cheeses in an ecologically valid fashion.
Procedure and Stimuli
The experiment used a two (low or high benefit context) by two (high or low price/quantity correlation) between-subject design with two dependent measures (perceptual judgment and preference judgment). The seven focal cheeses were the same as in experiment 1 and the low and high benefit contextual cheeses had the same width as the contextual cheeses in experiment 1. In the high correlation conditions, prices were calculated by multiplying the size of the cheese by $0.47. In the low correlation conditions, the price and quantity were not correlated for the contextual cheeses and prices for these cheeses varied within the same range as for the focal cheeses. The stimuli for each condition are shown in the appendix.
The procedure was identical to that used in experiment 1 except for the following changes. First, the pictures of the cheese were labeled with the type of cheese being rated.
Second, the price of the cheese was superimposed on the screen. One hundred forty-four undergraduates were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.
Results

Perceptual Judgments. As expected, participants contrasted their perceptual judgments
with the contextual stimuli. The judged sizes of the target stimuli were smaller in the high benefit context condition than in the low benefit context condition (F(1, 140) = 83.12, p < .01), but did not differ by correlation condition (F(1, 140) = 0.02, p > .10).
Preference Judgments. Figure 3 shows the mean preference rating of each stimulus in each context for the high correlation (panel A) and low correlation (panel B) conditions. The three-way interaction between context, the benefit/cost correlation, and stimulus level was statistically significant (F(6, 840) = 8.47, p < .01). This interaction implies that the location of the peaks in the low and high context conditions varies with the degree of correlation between benefits and costs.
Results in the high correlation conditions generally replicated the assimilation effect observed in experiment 1. First, the interaction between context and stimulus level was statistically significant (F(6, 420) = 13.0, p < .01). Second, each context condition did exhibit single-peaked preferences. Using Friedman's test, we found significant differences in preferences for the seven stimuli in both the low benefit (χ 2 F (6) = 18.0, p < .01) and high benefit (χ 2 F (6) = 25.4, p < .01) contexts. Third, we tested for an assimilation effect of the contextual stimuli. The 9 cm stimulus received the highest mean rating in the low benefit context, whereas the 15 cm stimulus received the highest mean rating in the high benefit context. Comparing the 9 cm stimulus and the 15 cm stimulus across contexts, we found that 63.9% of the participants preferred the smaller stimulus in the low benefit context, whereas only 25.0% of the participants preferred the smaller stimulus in the high benefit context (z = 3.32, p < .01).
Results in the low correlation conditions showed a contrast effect. Although the interaction between context and stimulus level failed to reach significance owing to the variability in the preference peaks across respondents (F(6, 420) = 1.45, p > .05), each context condition did exhibit single-peaked preferences. Using Friedman's test, we found marginally significant differences in preferences for the seven stimuli in the low benefit context (χ 2 F (6) = 10.1, p < .10) and significant differences in preferences for the seven stimuli in the high benefit context (χ 2 F (6) = 16.7, p < .01). Given these results, we tested for a contrast effect of the contextual stimuli. The 15 cm stimulus received the highest mean rating in the low benefit context and the 11 cm stimulus received the highest mean rating in the high benefit context. We found that 63.9% of the participants preferred the larger stimulus in the low benefit context while only 33.3% preferred the larger stimulus in the high benefit context (z = 2.59, p < .01).
Cost-Benefit Tradeoff Model Fit.
For the perceptual judgments of the size, the costbenefit tradeoff model accounted for 94.1% of the variance attributable to the experimental manipulations (63.4% of 67.4%). For the preference judgments, we fit two models. The first model was the same as in experiment 1. Again, we assumed that the parameters for benefits and costs (α and β ) and the relative weight of benefits to costs (s), were equal across the two context and two correlation conditions. The model accounted for 89% (13.3% of 14.9%) of the variance explainable by the experimental manipulations (see figure 3) . 2 We also fit a second model that allowed the cost parameter (β) to vary across the correlation conditions. We wanted to confirm that the uncorrelated price manipulation was not making people more responsive to changes in price, a potential violation of our assumption that context effects were exerting their influence primarily through changes in range-frequency values. This less constrained model accounted for 90% of the variance explainable by the experimental manipulations (13.4% of 14.9%) and did not explain significantly more variance than the constrained model (χ 2 (1) = 0.67, p > .4).
Discussion
The data from experiment 2 support the cost-benefit tradeoff model. When contextual stimuli had correlated benefits and costs, the contextual stimuli shifted consumers' most preferred alternative toward the contextual stimuli, producing assimilation. However, when the benefits and costs of the contextual stimuli were uncorrelated, the contextual stimuli shifted consumers' most preferred alternative away from the contextual stimuli, producing contrast. The cost-benefit tradeoff model explains this result by proposing that benefit and cost scales are determined by range-frequency principles which are then transformed and integrated according to Coombs and Avrunin's (1977) theory of single-peaked preferences. When the benefits and costs of contextual stimuli are correlated, a change in the perception of benefits has an opposing effect on costs, producing assimilation. When the benefits and costs of contextual stimuli are uncorrelated, however, a contextual change in benefits is not offset by a corresponding effect on costs, thereby producing contrast effects. This result is similar to what is typically found when monotonic attribute distributions are manipulated orthogonally (Cooke and Mellers 1998; Mellers and Cooke 1994) .
EXPERIMENT 3
The goal of the third study was to manipulate the relative importance of benefits and costs and provide additional support for the cost-benefit tradeoff model. We manipulated benefit sensitivity by varying the number of persons for whom the consumer was purchasing. In the low benefit sensitivity condition, participants were told that they were buying for a party of two persons. In the high benefit sensitivity condition, participants were told that they were buying for a party of eight persons. We expected that larger products would be more appealing in the high benefit sensitivity condition. We also expected that the upward shift in the peak that accompanied increased benefit sensitivity would be greater in the presence of high benefit contextual stimuli than in the presence of low benefit contextual stimuli. As a consequence, we should observe a contrast effect in the low benefit sensitivity condition and observe an assimilation effect in the high benefit sensitivity condition.
Figure 4 provides an illustration of how different relative benefit and cost weights can lead to either contrast or assimilation. In this illustration, we assume that contextual stimuli have uncorrelated benefits/costs (i.e., contextual stimuli only influence benefits), and that the power parameter on the cost is higher than the power parameter on the benefit but is unaffected by our benefit sensitivity manipulation. The upper two panels in figure 4 represent a low benefit sensitivity condition (s in equation 7 is set to .43). Because the relative weight for costs is greater than for benefits, and benefits and costs are uncorrelated, we find that the location of the peak in the stimulus distribution is lower in the high benefit context (panel B) than in the low benefit context (panel A), a contrast effect. The lower two panels of figure 4 represent a situation in which the relative weight for benefits is greater than for costs (s in equation 7 is set to .67). In this case, the addition of the same contextual stimuli as in the upper two panels now produces an assimilation effect instead of a contrast effect. In the low benefit context (panel C), the regions of the greatest cost-benefit differential are at the low end of the distribution, so increasing the weight on benefits produces relatively little change in the peak. In the high benefit context (panel D), the greatest cost-benefit differential occurs at the high end of the distribution, so increases in the relative weight of benefits offer an opportunity for a more dramatic shift in the peak.
Procedure
The experiment used a two (low or high benefit context) by two (low or high benefit sensitivity) between-subject design with two dependent measures (preference judgment and perceptual judgment). The stimuli were the no correlation condition stimuli from experiment 2.
The procedure was identical to the procedure used in experiment 2. The benefit sensitivity manipulation involved telling participants the dinner party was for "two people" or for "eight people". There were no other differences across the benefit sensitivity scenarios. One hundred and twenty-one undergraduates recruited from an introductory marketing course were randomly assigned to one of the four conditions.
Results
Perceptual Judgments. The judged sizes of the target stimuli were smaller in the high benefit context than in the low benefit context (F(1, 213) = 163.0, p < .01). The effects of stimulus width on size judgments were greater when participants were buying for eight people than for two people (F(6, 717) = 3.10, p < .01), suggesting participants buying for eight people were more sensitive to differences in the sizes of the cheese, consistent with our manipulation.
Preference Judgments. Figure 5 plots mean evaluations of the target stimuli. Panel A shows data from the low benefit sensitivity conditions and Panel B shows data from the high benefit sensitivity conditions. The three-way interaction between context, benefit sensitivity, and stimulus level was statistically significant (F(6, 733) = 4.14, p < .01). This interaction implies that the location of the peaks in the low and high context conditions varies with the degree of benefit sensitivity.
Results in the low benefit sensitivity conditions (figure 5A) approximate those in the uncorrelated condition of experiment 2. Although the interaction between context and stimulus level was not statistically significant (F(6, 353) = 1.46, p > .05), there was a significant difference in preference among the seven stimuli in both the low benefit context (χ 2 F (6) = 621.9, p < .01) and the high benefit context (χ 2 F (6) = 629.1, p < .01) conditions. Given these differences, we confirmed there was a contrast effect of the contextual stimuli. In the low benefit context, the 15 cm stimulus received the highest mean rating, whereas in the high benefit context, the 13 cm stimulus received the highest mean rating. When we compare preferences for the 13 and 15 cm stimulus, we find that 73.3% of the participants in the low benefit context prefer the larger stimulus, whereas only 44.8% of the participants in the high benefit context prefer the larger stimulus (z = 2.23, p < .05).
In the high benefit sensitivity conditions (figure 5B) we find evidence of assimilation.
First, we confirmed the interaction between context and stimulus level was statistically significant (F(6, 372) = 3.72, p < .01). Second, we confirmed there were significant differences in preferences among the seven focal stimuli in both the low benefit (χ 2 F (6) =908.7, p < .01) and high benefit (χ 2 F (6) = 754.9, p < .01) contexts. Third, we confirmed there was an assimilation effect of the contextual stimuli. The 13 cm stimulus received the highest mean rating in the low benefit context and the 17 cm stimulus received the highest mean rating in the high benefit context. Comparing the 13 and 17 cm stimuli, we find that 74.3% of the participants in the low benefit context prefer the smaller stimulus, whereas 50.0% of the participants in the high benefit context prefer the smaller stimulus (z = 1.98, p < .05). Thus, the addition of the same contextual stimuli produces either contrast or assimilation depending on the relative weighting of the benefit and cost dimensions.
Cost-Benefit Tradeoff Model Fit.
For the perceptual judgments of the size, the costbenefit tradeoff model accounted for 94.6% of the variance attributable to the experimental manipulations (68.9% of 72.8%). For the preference judgments, we fit two models. The first model was identical to the constrained model used in experiment 2, except that the benefit and cost dimensions were assumed to be uncorrelated across all conditions. In particular, the first model kept the benefit and cost power parameters and the relative weights equal across all four conditions. The second model allowed the relative weights of the benefit and cost dimensions to vary with benefit sensitivity. If the cost-benefit tradeoff model is able to account for the changes in benefit sensitivity, we should find that the relative weight of benefits estimated in high benefit sensitivity conditions is significantly greater than that in the low benefit sensitivity conditions.
Overall, 22.5% of the variance in experiment 3 was explained by the experimental manipulations. Both models accounted for the explainable variance quite well. The constrained model accounted for 21.2% of the variance (94.2% of the explainable variance), whereas the less constrained model accounted for 21.8% of the variance (96.9% of the explainable variance).
Furthermore, when relative benefit and cost weights were allowed to vary, the estimated benefit weights were .572 and .677 in the low and high benefit sensitivity conditions, respectively. As predicted, the two estimates differed significantly (χ 2 (1) = 3.8, p < .05).
The predictions of the unconstrained cost-benefit tradeoff model are plotted as curves in figure 5 . These predictions show that the model is able to adequately account not only for the changes in stimulus orders across contexts and sensitivity conditions, but also for the overall pattern of the data. Most important, the model is able to capture the stimulus orders quite well with the same benefit and cost scales. This gives us increased confidence that benefit and cost scales are in fact determined according to range-frequency principles and combined according to Coombs and Avrunin's (1977) model of single-peaked preferences.
Discussion
The results of experiment 3 provide a direct test of the cost-benefit tradeoff model. We propose that context influences the perception of the benefits and costs associated with different stimuli and that the weighted difference between the resulting benefits and costs determines the most preferred alternative. If so, the relative weight of the benefit dimension should have a systematic impact on the effects of context. The addition of high benefit stimuli should tend to produce greater contrast in the low benefit sensitivity conditions than in the high benefit sensitivity conditions. Moreover, the contrast associated with these contextual stimuli is overwhelmed by the positive benefits of the large stimuli when benefit sensitivity is high, resulting in a contrast effect.
Our data are difficult to reconcile with an independent process account of these phenomena (Wedell and Pettibone 1999) . The independent process account assumes that the location of stimulus ideals depends on the central tendency of the stimulus distribution. The same stimulus distributions are used in the low and high sensitivity conditions in experiment 3.
The fact that identical contextual stimuli influence shifts in preference in different ways in the two conditions cannot be explained as a function of changes in the stimulus distribution. We conclude that the cost-benefit tradeoff model provides a generally superior account of our data.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
Our results show that adding contextual alternatives to a choice set has a complex influence on consumer judgment. In experiment 1, we show that perceptual judgments are monotonic and tend to contrast away from contextual stimuli, whereas preference judgments are single-peaked and tend to assimilate towards contextual stimuli. We provide a unified account for these results using the cost-benefit tradeoff model. We assume that participants' perceptions of the underlying benefits and costs associated with the alternatives are determined according to range-frequency theory and that these benefits and costs can be combined according to Coombs and Avrunin's (1977) model of single-peaked preferences. We claim that perceptual judgments and preference judgments can rely on the same inputs and the same processes, even though context exerts a countervailing influence on each type of judgment. For example, experiment 2
shows that reducing the correlation between the benefits and costs in contextual alternatives can lead to a contrast effect for both perceptual and preference judgments. Similarly, experiment 3
shows that reducing the relative weight of the benefit dimension can also lead to a contrast effect for both perceptual and preference judgments.
The idea that contextual alternatives can produce assimilation or contrast on singlepeaked preferences, depending on the correlation and the relative importance of the benefit/cost dimensions, may explain a number of behavioral phenomena. For instance, Petty and Wegener (1993) demonstrate that providing explicit statements about the contrastive effects of contextual stimuli can cause people to engage in correction processes resulting in assimilation. It is possible that rather than invoking corrective processing, their manipulations caused respondents to change the relative weight that they place on certain stimulus dimensions, thereby altering the contextual processing that was invoked. Similarly, researchers have found that the form of contextual processing depends on the amount of cognitive resources available to the judge (e.g., MeyersLevy and Tybout 1997). It is possible that rather than causing people to alter their cognitive processes when stimuli are encoded, the constraints on cognitive resources cause people to focus their attention to a different degree on the underlying cost and benefit dimensions of the stimuli, producing either assimilation or contrast. Future research should examine this possibility.
Limitations and Unresolved Issues
Although our results resolve the conundrum raised by Wedell and Pettibone (1999) , they raise a number of other important issues regarding the nature of context effects in consumer judgment. First, although the results suggest that context can have differential effects on underlying benefit and cost dimensions, we do not yet fully understand the nature of these dimensions. Our studies manipulated product size as a benefit and used total cost, which was proportional to product size, as the correlated cost dimension. Nonetheless, it is likely that products possess multiple benefit and cost dimensions, any or all of which are recruited when consumers are asked to evaluate a particular product. If so, these dimensions may each be perceived separately and integrated only after incorporating contextual information or they may be integrated first into unitary benefit and cost dimensions which are then contextualized.
Because benefits tend to be positively associated with one another (e.g., exercise tends to increase endurance, strength, and agility) and costs tend to be positively associated with one another (e.g., overeating negatively impacts one's waistline, health, and wallet), separate and integrated dimension theories will tend to predict the same result. However, it may be possible to unconfound particular benefit or cost dimensions to better distinguish the two accounts.
A second issue is how these results relate to the notion of stimulus comparability. Stapel, Koomen, and Velthuijsen (1998) claim that contextual stimuli can produce either assimilation or contrast depending on the similarity / distinctiveness of target and context, the "comparison relevance" of the contextual stimuli, and the newness or ambiguity of the target stimuli. They find that assimilation occurs for new or ambiguous stimuli that are similar to the context, but contrast occurs when stimuli are distinct. It is possible that by decreasing the quantity by price correlation we are making the focal stimuli more distinct, thereby making contrast more likely. If so, we should find that making the contextual stimuli more distinct in ways unrelated to the price/quantity relationship should still produce contrast effects. For example, we could give cheeses the same or different brand names in either the high or low correlation conditions.
According to Stapel et al. (1998) Information for focal stimuli is printed in bold. a Correlations reflect the correlation between size and price for each condition. 
FIGURE 1
COST-BENEFIT TRADEOFF MODEL PREDICTIONS
-
The open diamond (square) designates the stimulus having the highest mean preference rating in the low (high) context condition. 
